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ABSTRACT 
 
Intrafirm Mobility and Sex Differences in Pay 
 
In this paper we analyze eight years of employment data of a regional grocery store chain in 
the U.S. The data include job titles, wage rates, and earnings for all employees. We examine 
initial job assignments, mobility between departments, and mobility into supervisory and 
management positions in the firm. We model the flows of individuals between different 
departments and jobs within the firm as a Markov process. The estimated transition 
probabilities imply that expected seniority is greater for women. We find a pattern of intrafirm 
mobility and initial job assignment that generally penalizes women, even after taking account 
of individuals' characteristics. 
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A ubiquitous feature of the United States labor market is the segregation of men
and women into diﬀerent occupations and industries. An early paper by Oaxaca
(1973) found that women tend to be in lower paying occupations. Some economists
have argued that segregation of jobs into “men’s work” and “women’s work” is an
essential element of labor market discrimination. The crowding hypothesis asserts
that barriers that keep women from entering some jobs helps to maintain high wages
for men, while forcing women to work for lower wages. Bergman (1986, Chapter 5)
for example, stresses the role that segregation plays in reducing pay and advancement
of women employees, especially within “internal” labor markets. Bielby and Baron
(1984) examines how organizational structures and bureaucratic processes generate
and sustain discrimination. Data based on 393 California establishments over the
period 1959-79 indicated that segregation increases with establishment size and that
establishment size accounts for most of the association between establishment char-
acteristics and job segregation. Furthermore, the study observed that the scope for
job segregation lessens with the female share of employment. Neuman and Oaxaca
(2001) examines the eﬀects of selection eﬀects of occupational segregation on gender
wage diﬀerentials among professional workers. Depending on how gender diﬀerences
in the components on the selectivity terms are interpreted, estimates of gender dis-
crimination can vary widely. Baldwin et al. (2001) identify the eﬀects of occupational
segregation on gender wage gaps using a model of hiearchical discrimination in which
males have distaste for supervision by female managers. The model predicts that
the relative proportion of female workers declines exponentially as one moves up the
job ladder. Empirical results from a 1988 CPS sample of workers in the insurance
industry support this prediction.
In this paper we take advantage of a unique data set to examine job placement
1a n dp r o m o t i o n sw i t h i naﬁrm. We follow job progression and pay of the ﬁrm’s retail
employees for a period of 10 years, from 1976 to 1986. We ﬁnd that the pattern of
initial job placement and the promotion of female employees leads to a high level of
segregation. This segregation also leads to lower pay for female employees.
II. DATA
The data on which this analysis is based come from a large grocery retailer in the
United States. Table 1 brieﬂy summarizes some of the characteristics of the ﬁrm
during the period of our analysis. The ﬁrm operated between 55 and 60 retail stores,
employing 2200 to 2500 workers in its retail operation. (We do not have data for non-
retail employees, such as truck drivers, accountants or janitors.) About 60 percent
of these stores were located within a single large metropolitan area. The company
closed several stores and opened several new stores during this period.
The ﬁrm’s employees have changed over the period of analysis. The proportion of
employees who were women grew from about 36 percent to about 41 percent. Most
employees worked part-time, but this changed rather dramatically over this period —
growing from 1/2 to 3/4 of all employees. Seniority (and to a lesser extent, age) of
the typical employee increased over this period.
In the early 1980’s several women initiated a class action lawsuit, alleging discrim-
ination. The company lost the suit in 1984 and eventually reached a settlement in
1986. The settlement required the ﬁrm to pay several million dollars in “back pay”
and also to initiate aﬃrmative action policies for promotion and job assignment. We
show later in this paper that this had a dramatic impact on segregation of women
and men across jobs.
Figure 1 presents a simple organization chart for the company. Each store has
three salaried employees — the store manager, the assistant manager, and the relief
manager. All employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Most em-
2ployees are represented by the Retail Clerks Union, but meat department employees
are represented by a separate union.
There are basically four “departments” in each store: meat, produce, grocery,
and variety (non-foods). The produce and meat departments each have a manager.
These managers are part of the collective bargaining unit, and they receive a higher
wage than other employees. The night crew chief supervises stocking of the store
during the night, and also receives a wage premium. The variety department does
not have a manager. A few stores have specialized departments, such as a bakery;
these employees are lumped together in the “other” category. Courtesy clerks bag
and carry groceries for customers.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the job categories shown in Figure 1. The
average wage (or salary) is reported for each category, along with the average age,
average seniority, and proportion who are female of individuals holding those jobs as
of December 31, 1982. The average annual earnings are reported for employees who
held the same job title on December 31, 1981. These annual earnings include bonuses
paid to management employees. Most job titles encompass several diﬀerent pay rates.
Pay scales for clerks are based on seniority level. Scales may also vary slightly by
location because the union contracts vary slightly from city to city.
Store level managers typically earn substantially more than other employees. How-
ever, the average earnings of the meat department manager are greater than the
average earnings of the assistant or relief managers. Other meat department employ-
ees also receive relatively high wages compared with other departments.
Most employees in the store work as food clerks. This job includes those who stock
shelves and those who operate cash registers. The average wage for food clerks was
about $9 per hour at the end of 1982, excluding night shift or overtime premia. This
was probably a fairly attractive wage for a job with no special education requirements.
By comparison, the average wage of production workers in manufacturing in the
3United States for June, 1982 was $8.50.1
Produce clerks and variety clerks also stock. Produce clerks have the same union
wage scale as food clerks, but the variety clerks’ scale is much lower. The average
wage of variety clerks is $1.75 per hour less than for produce clerks or food clerks.
Courtesy clerks work for near the minimum wage. There is heavy turnover among
courtesy clerks, with average seniority of only about one year. Courtesy clerks are
about 10 years younger, on average, than food clerks or produce clerks.
III. SEGREGATION AND WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
The distribution of men and women across job titles is reported in Table 3. Job
titles within this company are highly segregated. For example, the store level manage-
ment and department management positions are occupied almost completely by male
employees. (No woman had ever been a store manager for the ﬁrm as of December
31, 1982.) While 39 percent of the work force is composed of women, 95 percent of
variety clerks and meat wrappers were women, but only 12 percent of produce clerks
were women, and less than 1 percent of meat cutters were women. Courtesy clerk
jobs are disproportionately ﬁlled by men.
A convenient way to summarize the level of segregation is to use the dissimilarity
index, D. This index is widely attributed to Duncan and Duncan (1955), who describe
some of its properties. The Duncan index is deﬁned as
 =
1
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 X
=1
¯
¯
¯

 − 


¯
¯
¯
where 

 is the proportion of all females in job ,a n d
 is the proportion of all males
in job . The dissimilarity index is bounded between 0 and 1. Proportional represen-
tation of men and women in all job categories would yield a value of 0; completely
segregated categories would yield a value of 1.  has a convenient interpretation —
it is equal to the fraction of women (or men) that would have to change jobs to have
4equal proportions of men and women in each job. In this case, about 46 percent
of women would have to change jobs to achieve proportional representation in all
jobs. For other applications of the dissimilarity index to labor market segregation,
see Albelda (1986) or Ransom (1990).
Table 4 reports the average characteristic so fm e na n dw o m e ni nt h ev a r i o u sh o u r l y -
paid jobs. In most jobs, the average woman is paid more than the average man,
reﬂecting the typically higher seniority and age of women employees. This is also
demonstrated in Table 5.
Table 5 presents results of regression analysis of the natural logarithm of the hourly
wage. (Salaried employees are excluded.) The ﬁrst column shows that women’s wages
are about 8.5 percent higher than men’s, on average. However, this diﬀerence is due
to the higher seniority and age of women. Column 2 shows that after allowing for
these diﬀerences, women’s wages are actually about 8 percent less than the wages of
similarly qualiﬁed men.
The third column of Table 5 includes indicators for the job title of the employee.
Once these are included, the male/female wage diﬀerence falls to only about 1 percent.
Thus, virtually all sex diﬀerences in pay can be explained by the job assignment of
the employee. In fact, column IV shows that job title variables explain about 95
percent of all of the variation in wages. Of course, this result cannot be a surprise,
since job titles are associated contractually with wage levels. But this analysis does
point out that the substantial wage diﬀerential observed in column II is the result of
segregation — women tend to be placed in low wage jobs relative to their seniority
and age.
IV. INTRAFIRM MOBILITY
The relatively disadvantageous job assignments for women can arise from two
sources: (1) initial assignment at time of hire, and (2) promotions or other job changes
5during the employee’s tenure at the ﬁrm. We will examine both of these issues using
various models.
AM a r k o vM o d e lo fM o b i l i t y
One way to capture intraﬁrm job movements is with a simple Markov model. As-
sume that there are  job categories. At any time, , the proportion of employees in
each category can be represented by a 1x vector, ,w h e r et h e element is .
We are interested in examining both the relationship between  and −1,a sw e l la s
t h el o n gr u nv a l u eo f as  becomes very large.
Central to this model is a matrix of transition probabilities. We deﬁne a x
matrix, 	,w h o s e
 element  represents the probability of moving from category
 in period  − 1 to category 
 in period .T h e  row contains the probabilities
of moving from category  in  − 1 to each of the  categories in period .T h u s ,
the elements of each row sum to 1 If the job mobility process is stationary, then the
following relationship must hold:
 = −1	 (1)
In general, one can express  i nt e r m so fa ni n i t i a lp e r i o dj o bd i s t r i b u t i o na n dt h e
transition matrix by backward recursion:
 = 0	
 (2)
The long-run distribution of employees across the  categories, ∗ is independent of
the initial distribution, and is deﬁned by
lim
→∞
¡
0	
¢
= 
∗ (3)
Without loss of generality, we designate the ﬁrst row of the transition probability
matrix 	 as the transition probabilities corresponding to a new hire being assigned job
6titles 1 through  We designate the ﬁrst column of 	 as the transition probabilities
corresponding to an employment separation (quit, discharge, retirement) from job
titles 1 through . The steady state solution ∗
1 (the ﬁrst element of ∗) may be
interpreted as the probability that an employee would leave the company in any given
period. Therefore, an employee’s expected tenure equals 1 ∗
1
Assuming that the long-run distribution is stationary, the solution for the elements
of ∗ is obtained from

∗
1 =1−
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=2
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∗
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∗
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In matrix notation the steady state solution to the process may be expressed as

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∗ ˜ 	 +  (6)
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 is an identity matrix of dimension .
In our case, the elements of 	 are estimated from observed transitions. We use the
following estimator:
ˆ  =
P
=2 
P
=2 −1
7where  is the number of employees in category 
 in year  who were in category 
in year  − 1 and −1 is the number of employees in category  in year  − 1.W e
have estimated these separately for men and women employees.
Tables 6.a and 6.b present our estimates of the transition matrices based on job
titles held by employees as of year-end 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979 transitions ob-
served. The entries in the rows of the table show the disposition of the individuals
who held the job title the previous year. For example, the second entry in the ﬁrst
column of Table 6.a shows that 8.45 percent of male store managers had separated
from the company by the end of the next year. This matrix clearly shows the path
to management — 3.9% of food clerks were promoted to night crew chief each year,
while 18.5 percent of crew chiefs were promoted to relief manager, and 19.5 percent
of relief managers were promoted to assistant manager, and 9.7 percent of assistant
managers were promoted to store manager.
This table also shows why men are absent from some job titles. For example, the
ﬁrst row of the table shows that no men were hired as meat wrappers or variety
clerks during the period. Those who held meat wrapper or variety clerk jobs at the
beginning of the period left the company at a high rate.
Table 6.b oﬀers a graphic explanation of the source of segregation. Many more
entries in this matrix contain zeroes than in the corresponding male matrix. The
largest fraction of women who are hired become food clerks, but about 7 percent of
all hires become meat wrappers and about 6 percent become variety clerks. Of the
food clerks, about 80 percent remain in the category each year and almost all of the
remaining 20 percent leave the ﬁrm. Less than 3/10ths of 1 percent move to the crew
chief position.2
The glass ceilings are apparent in Table 6.b. Female variety clerks have about a
2 percent chance of becoming food clerks, otherwise they either remain variety clerk
or leave the ﬁrm. Less than 1/2 of 1 percent of meat wrappers move to a diﬀerent
8position within the company each year. (Male meat department employees do not
move to other parts of the store, either.)
The implications of these transition rates can be summarized by looking at the long-
run job distribution for men and women. For the 1976-79 period the probabilities
of a job separation were 0.218 and 0.197 for men and women, respectively. These
probabilities imply an expected tenure of 4.6 years for men and 5.1 years for women.
For the 1983-86 period, the probabilities of a job separation increased to 0.270 and
0.231 for men and women. Correspondingly, the expected tenure fell to 3.7 years for
men and to 4.3 years for women. Therefore, the company could expect that women
w o u l ds t a yw i t ht h eﬁrm on average a half-year longer than the men. Conditional
upon remaining with the company, the steady state job title distribution is calculated
according to ∗
 (1 −  ∗
1)
=2 . Table 7 presents the long-run job title
distribution for the 1976-79 data that are presented in Tables 6.a and 6.b, and also
the long-run distribution implied by transitions observed between 1983 and 1986. The
level of segregation implied, as measured by the dissimilarity index, falls dramatically
from 0.562 to 0.325. The law suit ﬁled against the company in the early 1980’s may
have changed some of the employment practices of the ﬁrm.
Regression Analysis of Mobility
One weakness of the preceding Markov model is that it fails to take account of
diﬀerences in characteristics of men and women in the various job groups. While
this is unlikely to explain much of the gender diﬀerence (due to the higher average
qualiﬁcations of women in our sample), it is interesting to observe the patterns of
mobility related to characteristics of individuals. The most interesting group to ex-
amine is the food clerks, since that category contains signiﬁcant numbers of both
men and women. This is also a step in the track from hire to store level management
positions.3 We concentrate on two aspects of mobility: (1) separations (voluntary),
9and (2) promotions into management positions.
Table 8 examines separation probabilities, using a probit regression model. We
study the group of individuals present as food clerks as of December 31, 1978, and
employees have separated if they do not appear as employees in 1982. The ﬁrst col-
u m ns h o w st h a tw o m e na r em u c hl e s sl i k e l yt h a nm e nt ol e a v et h eﬁrm which is
consistent with the overall results of our Markov analysis. However, after controlling
for age and seniority the diﬀerence among Food Clerks is not statistically signiﬁcant.
This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that women have higher quit propen-
sities. Weiss’ (1984) analysis also found lower quit rates for women. He argues that
women should have lower quit rates if their opportunities outside the ﬁrm are gener-
ally inferior to men’s. There is a strong correlation between age, seniority, and the
separation rate, with the rate falling with age, and falling with seniority for the ﬁrst
10 years.4
In Table 9 we analyze the probability of a food clerk being promoted to a store level
management position (store manager, assistant manager or relief manager). Again,
we analyze employees who held the food clerk job as of December 31, 1978. The
dependent variable in the analysis indicates whether the employee held a store level
management job in 1982. (This will obviously understate the total number of promo-
tions, since some managers may leave the company and others may be demoted in the
intervening period.) Female food clerks are much less likely to be promoted, and the
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Age and seniority do a poor job of identifying
those who will be promoted.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis of the employment records of a single ﬁr m ,w eh a v ef o u n dt h a t
there is a high level of segregation of jobs along gender lines. This segregation arises
because some entry level jobs are assigned almost exclusively to women (and others to
10men), and because movements between jobs are much less likely to occur for women
than for men. In particular, women were almost totally excluded from department
level and store level management positions during the early years of our study. These
rates were more favorable for women in the later years of our data, perhaps due to
the “shock eﬀect” of a class action lawsuit.
This segregation results in lower pay for women. Our analysis of hourly workers
found that in 1982, women’s wage rates were about 8 percent lower than men’s, after
controlling for age and seniority.5This diﬀerence can be explained almost completely
by the diﬀerent job assignments for men and women. This measure clearly understates
the pay gap due to segregation, since the predominantly male, high paying, store
management positions are salaried, and thus are not included in this analysis.
Given a ﬁnding of gender inequity in the workplace, inquiry would naturally shift
to the remedies that a ﬁrm or court of law should consider. In Oaxaca and Ransom
(2000) several within-ﬁrm equity salary adjustment algorithms are developed. These
algorithms are designed to satisfy various constraints such as total disbursement of
the originally estimated aggregate salary inequity, invariance of the salaries of male
workers with respect to a salary adjustment mechanism, the avoidance of salary re-
ductions for women stemming from an adjustment mechanism, and positive lower
bound constraints on salary adjustments for women. Simulations were run in which
these salary adjustment algorithms were applied to a 1986 data set from the same
company represented in the present study. Depending on which constraints are sat-
isﬁed, the distribution of equity salary adjustments can be quite diﬀerent. However,
these algorithms beg the question of how they should be implemented. This is an
important question in the light of this paper’s ﬁndings that gender diﬀerences in job
titles can be a major, if not the sole, reason for gender salary inequity. Pure salary ad-
justments without a program for short-term job reassignments and long-term equity
in promotion and hiring is tantamount to a comparable worth solution. A solution
11along these lines most likely would distort the occupational wage structure.
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1. Source, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-83 (103rd edition), Table
665.
2. Note that the fact that women crew chiefs present in one year always show up
in the same job the next year presents a problem for our long-run analysis. We
have assumed that no women will have the job title.
3. Positions such as variety clerk and meat wrapper show almost no mobility, so
they do not present an interesting case for regression analysis.
4. Using a diﬀerent functional form, we found that separation rates were about the
same for those above about 25 years of age. Of course, separation rates among
the youngest workers are extremely high.
5. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) reports wage decompositions based on a 1986 sam-
ple from the same ﬁrm. Separate (log) earnings equations were estimated for
males and females. Depending on the type of decomposition used, the unex-
plained earnings gap ranged from 28.8 percent to 33.1 percent in favor of men
after accounting for age and seniority. Some of the unexplained gap may have
resulted from diﬀerent labor supply choices, but much had to do with job as-
signment.
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151976 1982 1986
Number of Stores 60 58 55
Number of Stores in Largest 35 36 32
Metropolitan Area
Number of Retail Employees 2,182 2,480 2,489
Percent of Employees who 36.20% 38.80% 41.20%
are Female
Percent of Employees who 50.80% 65.40% 75.60%
work Part Time
Average Age 29.6 31 31.7
Average Seniority 4.5 5.9 6.3
Table 1
Company Characteristics
Retail Operations
Selected Years (As of 31 December)Standard
Job Title Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Weekly Salary 609.00         0 609.00         609.00        
Annual Earnings 34,099.05    3,859.89    31,543.00    44,204.10   
Store Manager Seniority 15.61           8.23           0.38             34.12          
(N=58) Age 39.44           9.92           25.19           63.14          
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weekly Salary 541.00         0.00 541.00         541.00        
Annual Earnings 28,308.88    386.64       27,536.00    29,199.00   
Assistant Manager Seniority 10.85           6.42           0.41             34.21          
(N=58) Age 33.34           8.68           21.97           54.97          
Female 0.05             0.22           0.00 1.00            
Weekly Salary 513.00         0.00 513.00         513.00        
Annual Earnings 26,561.52    146.16       26,147.00    27,047.00   
Relief Manager Seniority 7.04             5.06           0.55             31.13          
(N=57) Age 30.16           9.44           20.30           58.44          
Female 0.05             0.23           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 9.06             0.99           5.58             9.55            
Annual Earnings 17,222.82 3199,21 3,283.58      23,297.20   
Food Clerk Seniority 6.39             5.08           0.03             32.83          
(N=1,114) Age 33.36           11.76         17.72           65.02          
Female 0.54             0.50           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 9.65             0.12           9.50             9.75            
Annual Earnings 20,984.38    1,391.08    17,841.61    24,153.07   
Night Crew Chief Seniority 6.32             3.98           0.50             22.34          
(N=56) Age 29.68           8.97           20.54           56.83          
Female 0.05             0.23           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 3.19             0.29           2.85             3.60            
Annual Earnings 4,859.61      1,408.86    1,760.35      9,761.70     
Courtesy Clerk Seniority 0.90             0.83           0.02             4.40            
(N=568) Age 19.16           4.62           16.09           72.63          
Female 0.29             0.46           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 9.85             0.10           9.65             10.01          
Annual Earnings 23,454.38    1,108.86    18,900.44    25,165.37   
Produce Manager Seniority 14.64           8.61           2.17             31.90          
(N=58) Age 36.29 9.86           20.04           56.61          
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2
Characteristics of Job Holders
Year End, 1982Standard
Job Title Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Hourly Wage 8.95             1.13 5.58             9.55            
Annual Earnings 17,899.87    3,478.52    7,811.48      22,281.83   
Produce Clerk Seniority 6.61             6.62           0.22             32.78          
(N=109) Age 30.21           10.39         16.73           61.89          
Female 0.12             0.33           0.00 0.00
Hourly Wage 11.64           0.09           11.29           11.67          
Annual Earnings 29,147.17    1,572.17    25,116.82    32,309.71   
Meat Manager Seniority 11.43           7.43           1.42             29.08          
(N=57) Age 40.65           9.05           27.21           64.48          
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hourly Wage 11.28           0.33           7.20             11.33          
Annual Earnings 24,523.44    2,652.64    3,212.41      28,909.21   
Meat Cutter Seniority 7.19             5.87           0.41             28.64          
(N=168) Age 41.36           11.01         23.11           65.98          
Female 0.01             0.08           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 10.28           0.27           9.07             10.40          
Annual Earnings 18,758.66    4,164.13    2,156.20      24,197.57   
Meat Wrapper Seniority 8.33             6.88           0.23             26.00          
(N=89) Age 41.90           11.42         20.47           64.84          
Female 0.97             0.18           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 7.26             0.96           5.39             8.64            
Annual Earnings 13,132.72    2,410.48    7,736.17      17,021.99   
Variety Clerk Seniority 6.42             4.67           0.16             16.31          
(N=78) Age 32.69           12.63         16.71           63.34          
Female 0.95             0.22           0.00 1.00            
Hourly Wage 6.55             0.95           5.58             8.47            
Annual Earnings 11,659.68    3,074.14    7,674.86      18,272.61   
Other Seniority 5.86             5.59           0.24             18.96          
(N=13) Age 36.28           15.57         18.05           62.08          
Female 0.77             0.44           0.00 1.00            
Table 2 (con't)
Characteristics of Job Holders
Year End, 1982Women Fraction Men Fraction
Holding of All Holding of All
Title Women Title Men
Store Manager 0 0.000 58 0.038
Assistant Manager 3 0.003 55 0.036
Relief Manager 3 0.003 55 0.036
Food Clerk 599 0.623 507 0.334
Night Crew Chief 3 0.003 53 0.035
Courtesy Clerk 170 0.177 403 0.265
Produce Manager 0 0.000 58 0.038
Produce Clerk 13 0.014 96 0.063
Meat Manager 0 0.000 57 0.038
Meat Cutter 1 0.001 167 0.110
Meat Wrapper 86 0.089 3 0.002
Variety Clerk 74 0.077 4 0.003
Other 10 0.010 3 0.002
Total 962 1.000 1518 1.000
Distribution of Men and Women Across Jobs
in 1982
Table 3Average Average
Job Title Variable Male Female
Food Clerk Wage 9.03 9.09
Seniority 5.84 6.88
Age 27.9 37.99
Night Crew Chief Wage 9.66 9.58
Seniority 6.10 10.35
Age 29.03 41.17
Courtesy Clerk Wage 3.17 3.23
Seniority 0.90 0.99
Age 18.95 19.41
Produce Manager Wage 9.85 -         
Seniority 14.64 -         
Age 36.29 -         
Produce Clerk Wage 9.02 8.48
Seniority 7.10 2.95
Age 30.56 27.65
Meat Manager Wage 11.64 -         
Seniority 11.43 -         
Age 40.65 -         
Meat Cutter Wage 11.28 11.33
Seniority 7.22 1.47
Age 41.44 28.7
Meat Wrapper Wage 9.76 10.3
Seniority 2.15 8.55
Age 21.25 42.63
Variety Clerk Wage 5.71 7.35
Seniority 2.15 8.55
Age 18.31 33.47
Other Wage 5.81 6.77
Seniority 2.43 6.88
Age 29.33 38.37
Table 4
Average Characteristics of Employees
in Hourly-Paid Jobs, By Sex
(December 31, 1982)I II III IV
Intercept 1.926 -0.221 0.870 1.152
(0.013) (0.047) (0.018) (0.005)
Female 0.084 -0.078 -0.013 0.011
(0.020) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Seniority -            0.065 0.019 -           
(0.003) (0.001)
(Seniority)
2 -          -2.25e-03 -6.23e-04 -          
(1.26e-04) (4.60e-05)
Age -            0.111 0.019 -           
(0.003) (0.001)
(Age)
2 -          -1.30e-03 -2.19e-04 -          
(3.04e-05) (1.61e-05)
Food Clerk -            -            0.903 1.039
(0.007) (0.006)
Night Crew Chief -            -            0.966 1.115
(0.015) (0.015)
Produce Manager -            -            0.946 1.135
(0.015) (0.015)
Produce Clerk -            -            0.900 1.029
(0.011) (0.011)
Meat Manager -            -            1.100 1.303
(0.015) (0.015)
Meat Cutter -            -            1.100 1.303
(0.015) (0.015)
Meat Wrapper -            -            1.014 1.167
(0.013) (0.013)
Variety Clerk -            -            0.689 0.811
(0.013) (0.014)
Other -            -            0.596 0.710
(0.027) (0.031)
Courtesy Clerk -            -            -            -           
R
2 0.007 0.676 0.961 0.949
Regression Results, Hourly Workers 1982
Dependent Variable is Logarithm of Hourly Wage
(Standard Errors are in Parentheses)
Table 5Source Terminated Store Assistant Relief Food Crew Courtesy Produce Produce Meat Meat Meat Variety Other
Category Manager Manager Manager Clerk Chief Clerk Manager Clerk Manager Cutter Wrapper Clerk
New Hires 0 0.0026 0.0013 0.0086 0.205 0.0086 0.6839 0.002 0.0271 0.0007 0.0602 0 0 0
Store 0.0847 0.8701 0.0282 0 0.0113 0 0 0.0056 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Assistant 0.1257 0.0971 0.7371 0.0229 0.0171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Relief 0.1379 0 0.1954 0.6207 0.0402 0 0 0.0057 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Food 0.2277 0.0008 0.0024 0.0295 0.6561 0.039 0.0247 0.0024 0.0175 0 0 0 0 0
Clerk
Crew 0.1481 0 0 0.1852 0.1852 0.463 0 0 0.0185 0 0 0 0 0
Chief
Courtesy 0.6487 0 0 0 0.1377 0.0024 0.1733 0 0.0364 0 0.0016 0 0 0
Clerk
Produce 0.0457 0 0.0057 0.0057 0 0 0 0.88 0.0629 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Produce 0.1709 0 0 0.0028 0.1289 0 0.0112 0.0364 0.6471 0 0.0028 0 0 0
Clerk
Meat 0.0629 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8914 0.0457 0 0 0
Manager
Meat 0.1111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0025 0.042 0.8444 0 0 0
Cutter
Meat 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wrapper
Variety 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0
Clerk
Other 0.3333 0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333
Table 6.a.
Transition Probabilities - Male Employees
December 31, 1976 - December 31, 1979
Destination CategorySource Terminated Store Assistant Relief Food Crew Courtesy Produce Produce Meat Meat Meat Variety Other
Category Manager Manager Manager Clerk Chief Clerk Manager Clerk Manager Cutter Wrapper Clerk
New Hires 0 0 0 0 0.4627 0 0.4004 0 0.0044 0 0 0.069 0.0567 0.0067
Store 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Assistant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Relief 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Food 0.1895 0 0 0.0006 0.804 0.0026 0.0019 0 0.0006 0 0 0 0.0006 0
Clerk
Crew 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chief
Courtesy 0.6122 0 0 0 0.1749 0 0.1574 0 0.0117 0 0 0.0058 0.0379 0
Clerk
Produce 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Produce 0.2500           0 0 0 0.2500    0 0.125 0 0.375 0 0 0 0 0
Clerk
Meat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager
Meat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cutter
Meat 0.1853 0 0 0 0 0 0.0035 0 0 0 0 0.8112 0 0
Wrapper
Variety 0.2222 0 0 0 0.0206 0 0.0041 0 0 0 0 0 0.7531 0
Clerk
Other 0.3235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0294 0 0.6471
Table 6.b.
Transition Probabilities - Female Employees
December 31, 1976 - December 31, 1979
Destination CategoryJob Title Males Females Male Female
Store Manager 0.041 0.000 0.025 0.007
Assistant Manager 0.045 0.000 0.020 0.012
Relief Manager 0.045 0.000 0.022 0.016
Food Clerk 0.313 0.700 0.323 0.583
Night Crew Chief 0.028 0.000 0.035 0.003
Courtesy Clerk 0.240 0.120 0.371 0.267
Produce Manager 0.037 0.000 0.032 0.000
Produce Clerk 0.071 0.005 0.063 0.020
Meat Manager 0.051 0.000 0.019 0.000
Meat Cutter 0.126 0.000 0.056 0.003
Meat Wrapper 0.000 0.094 0.003 0.011
Variety Clerk 0.000 0.076 0.005 0.051
Other 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.027
Retail Operations 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000
Expected Tenure 4.6 yrs 5.1 yrs 3.7 yrs 4.3 yrs
Dissimilarity Index
Table 7
Long-Run Job Distributions From Markov Model
0.562 0.325
Based On
1976-79
Transitions
Based On
1983-86
TransitionsVariable I II
Intercept
Female
Age
Age
2
Seniority
Seniority
2
Sample Size
Log Likelihood -670.87 -638.79
-- 0.006
(0.001)
1,001 1,001
(0.0003)
-- -0.129
(0.023)
-- 0.001
(0.025)
-- 0.001
-.245 -0.108
(0.080) (0.100)
-0.109 1.651
(0.059) (0.410)
Table 8
Probit Regression Results - Food Clerks
Determinants of Separation, 1978-1982
(Standard Errors are in Parenthesis)Variable
Intercept
Female
Age
Age
2
Seniority
Seniority
2
Sample Size
Log Likelihood
II I
Table 9
Probit Regression Results - Food Clerks
Promotions to Store Level
(Standard Errors are in Parenthesis)
Management Positions, 1978-82
-1.363 -0.952
(0.084) (1.063)
-0.999 -0.755
(0.185) (0.217)
-- -0.018
(0.072)
-- -0.0001
(0.0011)
-- 0.096
(0.092)
-161.21 -155.46
-- -0.013
(0.011)
1,001 1,001Figure 1
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